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Figure 1: Samples of CIFAR10 original images (top) and semantic adversarial examples (bottom) on VGG16 network.
Adversarial images are generated by converting original images into the HSV color space and randomly shifting the Hue and
Saturation components, while keeping Value the same. All images in first row are correctly classified by the model.
Abstract
Deep neural networks are known to be vulnerable to ad-
versarial examples, i.e., images that are maliciously per-
turbed to fool the model. Generating adversarial examples
has been mostly limited to finding small perturbations that
maximize the model prediction error. Such images, how-
ever, contain artificial perturbations that make them some-
what distinguishable from natural images. This property is
used by several defense methods to counter adversarial ex-
amples by applying denoising filters or training the model
to be robust to small perturbations.
In this paper, we introduce a new class of adversarial ex-
amples, namely “Semantic Adversarial Examples,” as im-
ages that are arbitrarily perturbed to fool the model, but in
such a way that the modified image semantically represents
the same object as the original image. We formulate the
problem of generating such images as a constrained opti-
mization problem and develop an adversarial transforma-
tion based on the shape bias property of human cognitive
system. In our method, we generate adversarial images by
first converting the RGB image into the HSV (Hue, Satura-
tion and Value) color space and then randomly shifting the
Hue and Saturation components, while keeping the Value
component the same. Our experimental results on CIFAR10
dataset show that the accuracy of VGG16 network on ad-
versarial color-shifted images is 5.7%.
1. Introduction
Image classifiers are vulnerable to adversarial inputs,
i.e., it is possible to carefully modify an image such that
the model will classify it into a wrong label, while a human
observer perceives the original object [1, 2]. The existence
of adversarial examples is intriguing from learning perspec-
tive, since models that outperform human in classifying nat-
ural images can be so easily fooled by adding a hardly vis-
ible perturbation. Also from the security perspective, such
attacks pose a major threat, as machine learning systems
are being increasingly integrated into critical and security-
sensitive applications, such as autonomous cars, medical di-
agnosis, and banking.
Generating adversarial examples has been mostly limited
to finding small perturbations that maximize the model pre-
diction error [3–6]. Such modified images, however, con-
tain artificial perturbations that make them somewhat dis-
tinguishable from natural images. This property is used by
several defense methods to make deep learning models ro-
bust against small perturbations [7, 8] or to map the per-
turbed image back into the space of natural images by ap-
plying preprocessing filters [9, 10].
In practice, however, the adversary may not be con-
strained with slightly modifying the image. That is, the ad-
versary may perturb the image a lot, but in such a way that
the modified image semantically represents the same object
as the original image (because otherwise, we cannot expect
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the model to classify it correctly). To construct such images,
we need to identify the types of transformations that human
vision is invariant to and investigate how do start-of-the-art
deep learning models compare to humans.
One property of human cognitive system is the “shape
bias”, i.e., when assigning a name to new items, humans
weight shape more heavily than they do other dimensions
of perceptual similarity, such as size or texture [11]. Convo-
lutional Neural Networks (CNNs) are similarly designed to
take into account the spatial structure of image data. In fact,
models trained on ImageNet are shown to display shape bias
as well [12].
In this paper, we make the following contributions.
• We introduce a new class of adversarial examples,
namely semantic adversarial examples, as images that
are arbitrarily perturbed to fool the model, but seman-
tically represent the original objects. We formulate
the problem as a constrained optimization problem, re-
quiring the modified image to be smooth and natural-
looking, so as to be undetectable by current defense
methods.
• We propose a method for generating semantic adver-
sarial images, based on the shape bias property of hu-
man cognitive system. In our method, we first convert
the image from RGB into the HSV color space, com-
posed of Hue, Saturation and Value color channels.
We then randomly shift the hue and saturation compo-
nents, while keeping the value the same. This approach
generates images that contain the original object with
different colors and colorfulness.
• We perform the experiments on CIFAR10 dataset and
VGG16 network. The results show that the model
accuracy on adversarial color-shifted images is 5.7%.
Figure 1 shows samples of CIFAR10 original images
and their corresponding modified images that fool
the VGG16 model. As can be seen, modified images
represent the same object as original images. We
also apply the attack on the state-of-the-art robust
model against adversarial examples [8] and show that
the model accuracy drops to 8.6% when tested on
adversarial color-shifted images. The code for gener-
ating adversarial color-shifted images is available at
https://github.com/HosseinHosseini/
Semantic-Adversarial-Examples.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the problem of generating semantic adversarial ex-
amples. In section3, we first provide a background on
shape bias property and HSV color space and then propose
a method for generating adversarial color-shifted images.
Section 4 presents the experimental results. Section 5 re-
views the related works and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Problem Statement
2.1. Adversarial Examples
In this paper, we consider the misclassification attack.
Current techniques for generating adversarial examples try
to find a perturbation that maximizes the network prediction
error. Let F be the machine learning classifier and x be the
given image. The adversarial perturbation is typically found
by solving the following optimization problem [2]:
min ‖δ‖ (1)
s.t. F (x+ δ) 6= F (x).
The added perturbation in adversarial examples is usu-
ally small and, hence, the modified image is likely to belong
to the same class as the original image. The image, however,
does contain an artificial perturbation that makes it some-
what distinguishable from natural images. This property is
used by several defense methods to counter adversarial ex-
amples by explicitly applying denoising operations [9, 10]
or training the model to do so implicitly [7, 8].
2.2. Semantic Adversarial Examples
In practice, the adversary may not be constrained with
slightly modifying the image. That is, the image can be
modified by any transformation, conditioned that the trans-
formation preservers the semantics of the image. Let Ω be
the human vision system. The problem of generating se-
mantic adversarial examples is stated as follows:
find x∗ (2)
s.t. Ω(x∗) = Ω(x) and F (x∗) 6= F (x).
The problem (2) can be seen as mapping any given image
into the space of natural images that are misclassified by
the model, but contain the original object. In this sense,
wrongly-classified clean images are adversarial examples
with zero perturbation.
Identifying and studying adversarial transformations is
important from the learning perspective, since it helps to
investigate how the model compares to human visual system
and also to analyze the model generalization performance.
Moreover, such adversarial transformations will be able to
evade state-of-the-art defense methods that try to reverse the
added perturbation. Therefore, it is important also from the
security perspective to identify the attack space and develop
more robust defense mechanisms.
3. Proposed Method
In this section, we first review the shape bias property of
human cognitive system. We then provide a background on
HSV color space and finally propose a method for gener-
ating semantic adversarial examples by shifting the image
color components.
3.1. Shape Bias Property of Human Cognitive Sys-
tem
To construct semantic adversarial examples, we need to
identify the properties of human vision system. One such
property is the “shape bias,” stating that humans prefer
to categorize objects according to their shape rather than
color [11]. Therefore, we expect machine learning models
to also correctly classify images that contain the original
object with different colors. In the following, we propose a
method to generate such images.
3.2. HSV Color Space
HSV (Hue, Saturation and Value) is an alternative to
RGB (red, green and blue) color space and is known to
more closely represent the way human vision perceives
color [13]. The hue channel corresponds to the color’s po-
sition on the color wheel. As hue increases from 0 to 1, the
color transitions from red to orange, yellow, green, cyan,
blue, magenta, and finally back to red. Saturation measures
the colorfulness, i.e., setting saturation to 0 yields a gray-
scale image and increasing it to 1 generates the most col-
orful image with same colors. Value shows the brightness,
which is maximum value of red, green and blue compo-
nents.
3.3. Color-Shifted Images as Semantic Adversarial
Examples
HSV can be seen as a color space, in which color com-
ponents (hue and saturation) are decoupled from the object
structure (brightness). Therefore, by changing the hue and
saturation components and keeping the value the same, we
can generate images that contain the original object with
different color and colorfulness. Let xH , xS and xV re-
spectively denote the hue, saturation and value components
of image x. The problem of generating semantic adversar-
ial examples by changing the image color can be stated as
follows:
find x∗ (3)
s.t. x∗V = xV and F (x
∗) 6= F (x).
For solving (3), we can generate random images, set their
value component to xV and then choose the ones that are
misclassified by the model. Equally, we can start from the
given image and randomly perturb the hue and saturation
components in such a way that the modified image can fool
the model. These methods, however, will generate images
with visible noise.
In order to generate smooth and natural-looking images,
we shift the hue and saturation components of all pixels by
the same amount. This approach generates an image where
all pixels are equally colored if the shift in saturation is posi-
tive or decolored if the shift is negative. The color of all pix-
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Figure 2: Illustration of shifting color components (hue and
saturation) in HSV color space on a sample image of CI-
FAR10 dataset. The center image is the original one. Shift-
ing hue and saturation components changes the color and
colorfulness, respectively. As can be seen, the original ob-
ject is recognizable in all images.
els (the hue component) is also shifted by a fixed amount.
We call such images as color-shifted images.
We also note that significantly decreasing or increasing
the saturation component generates gray-scale or too color-
ful images, respectively, and hence causes the image to be
less like a natural color image. To generate better looking
images, we add a requirement that the saturation compo-
nent be minimally shifted. Figure 2 shows a sample image
of CIFAR10 dataset and several color-shifted images. The
center image is the original one. As can be seen, images
differ in color and colorfulness across variations in hue and
saturation components, respectively. Also, while the origi-
nal object is recognizable in all images, images closer to the
middle column look more like natural color images.
Let δH and δS denote the shifts in hue and saturation
components, respectively. Adversarial color-shifted images
can be generated by solving the following problem:
min |δS | (4)
s.t.

x∗H = (xH + δH) mod 1
x∗S = clip(xS + δS , 0, 1)
x∗V = xV
and F (x∗) 6= F (x).
Note that δH and δS are scalars. The color in hue compo-
nent changes in a circle, i.e., hue of 1 is equal to hue of 0.
Hence, we compute the modulo of hue component with 1 to
map it to [0, 1]. The saturation component, however, should
be clipped to the interval of [0, 1].
3.4. Algorithm
To solve (4), we do a random search over parameters δH
and δS , and obtain the modified image as described in first
constraint of (4). We continue generating color-shifted im-
ages until the modified image is misclassified by the model
or the maximum number of trials, denoted byN , is reached.
The shift in hue component is chosen as δH ∼ U(0, 1),
where U(a, b) denotes uniform distribution in [a, b]. How-
ever, to find adversarial images with smaller saturation shift,
δS is chosen as δS ∼ U(− iN , iN ), where i is the iteration
number. That is, we start with δS = 0 and linearly in-
crease the interval after each trial. Algorithm 1 describes
the method.
Algorithm 1 Generating Adversarial Color-shifted Images
1: Input: Classifier F , Image x, Maximum number of tri-
als N
2: Output: Adversarial color-shifted image x∗ or ∅
3: xH , xS , xV ← Hue, Saturation and Value components
of image x, respectively.
4: x∗ ← x
5: for i = 0, ..., N − 1 do
6: δH ← a number uniformly chosen in [0, 1]
7: δS ← a number uniformly chosen in [− iN , iN ]
8: x∗H = (xH + δH) mod 1
9: x∗S = clip(xS + δS , 0, 1)
10: if F (x∗) 6= F (x) then
11: return x∗
12: end if
13: end for
14: return ∅
4. Experimental Results
Experiments are performed on image dataset CIFAR10,
which consists of natural color images in 10 classes of air-
plane, automobile, bird, cat, deer, dog, frog, horse, ship
and truck [14]. We apply the attack on the pretrained
VGG16 network [15], a robust network proposed by Madry
et al. [8], and the VGG16 network trained with both original
and color-shifted images. In experiments, we set maximum
number of trials N = 1000.
Table 1 provides the results for different models. The ac-
curacy of pretrained VGG16 network drops to 5.7% when
tested on adversarial color-shifted images. Figure 1 shows
samples of original images and their corresponding color-
shifted images that are misclassified by the model. As can
be seen, the original object is recognizable in all of the ad-
versarial images. Figure 3 shows attack success rate versus
Table 1: Accuracy of different CNNs on test data and
adversarial color-shifted images. The VGG-augmented is
a VGG16 network trained with both original and color-
shifted images.
Network Accuracy on
test images
Accuracy on adversarial
color-shifted images
Pretrained VGG16 [15] 93.6% 5.7%
Madry et al. Model [8] 87.3% 8.4%
VGG-augmented 89.9% 69.1%
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Figure 3: Attack success rate versus number of trials. For
more than 14% of images, the model is fooled after trying
only one color-shifted image, obtained by randomly shifting
only the hue component.
number of trials. For more than 14% of images, the model
can be fooled by trying only one modified image, obtained
by randomly shifting only the hue component. The results
show that although the model achieves accuracy of 93.6%
on test data, it is fragile to images with maliciously-shifted
color components.
We also applied targeted attack on VGG16 network. In
our method, the attack space is limited, since we search
over only two parameters. Nevertheless, we could achieve
35.4% success rate on images that are correctly classified by
model, i.e., adversarial color-shifting can change the model
prediction to an average of more than three classes. Figure 4
shows sample images of CIFAR10 dataset, each with three
color-shifted versions classified into different labels.
The model proposed by Madry el al. yields the state-of-
the-art results against adversarial examples [16], by provid-
ing robustness against worse-case perturbations [8]. We ap-
ply our attack also on this model to ensure that our method
does not add noise-like perturbation to the image. We ob-
served that the accuracy of the robust CNN is 8.4% on
adversarial color-shifted images, implying that even if the
airplane automobile frog ship
bird airplane dog frog
horse bird cat frog
ship automobile bird horse
truck airplane frogautomobile
Figure 4: Sample images of CIFAR10 dataset, along with
three color-shifted versions classified into different labels
by VGG16 network. The leftmost-column shows original
images.
model is robust to perturbations around data points, it does
not provide robustness to semantic adversarial examples.
We also applied the attack on a VGG16 network which,
at each epoch, is trained with original and color-shifted im-
ages with δH ∼ U(0, 1) and δS ∼ U(−1, 1). The accuracy
on adversarial color-shifted images is 69.1%, indicating that
the model shows more robustness when trained with same
types of images. However, as pointed out in [17], robustness
achieved by data augmentation may not be an indication
that the model has learned higher level semantic features
in the dataset. That is, the network is likely to be vulnerable
to other types of semantic adversarial examples. We will
explore other attack and defense methods in future works.
5. Related Work
Over the past several years, many techniques have been
proposed to generate adversarial examples by finding a
small perturbation that can fool the model. Such techniques,
including Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [3], Deep-
Fool [4], Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [5], and Car-
lini and Wagner attacks [6], usually involve an optimization
problem that solves for a perturbation that maximizes the
model prediction error. In this paper, we proposed an im-
age transformation that may introduce large pixel-wise per-
turbation, but preserves the semantics of the image. Our
proposed transformation has tunable parameters that can be
searched over to generate adversarial images.
It has been shown that CNNs trained with clean im-
ages generalize poorly to images with reversed brightness,
called negative images [18]. Compared to color-shifted im-
ages, negative images are less recognizable to humans [19].
Moreover, image complementing is a fixed transformation
and cannot be adjusted to force the model to misclassify im-
ages. In [17], Fourier filtering methods are used to slightly
modify images such that they contain the same high level
abstractions but exhibit different surface statistical regular-
ities. They showed that, in the worst case, the CNN accu-
racy reduces more than 20% when tested on such images.
In comparison, our method introduces large perturbation to
the image and reduces model accuracy by about 90%.
In [20], the authors showed that adversarial translation
and rotation can fool CNNs. The rotated images, however,
may look unnatural to humans, due to the black borders and
the existence of tilted objects. In [21], the authors consid-
ered the problem of generating natural adversarial exam-
ples using generative adversarial networks. Their proposed
method generates images that look natural, but may belong
to a different class than the original class. Hence, such im-
ages do not fit into our definition of semantic adversarial ex-
amples. In [22], the authors suggested that instead of small
or imperceptible perturbations, the adversary may opt for
more effective but noticeable perturbations, and proposed
a method to create adversarial patches. Our method also
generates images with large modification, however in such
a way that the perturbation is not visible, i.e., the modified
image is smooth and natural-looking.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced Semantic Adversarial Ex-
amples as images that semantically represent the original
object, but are misclassified by the model. We proposed
a method for generating such images by shifting the color
components of the image in HSV color space, and showed
that the generated images are smooth and natural-looking.
Our experimental results on CIFAR10 dataset show that
the accuracy of state-of-the-art CNNs on adversarial color-
shifted images is less than 10%.
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